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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann, (1953) and pursuant to Rules 3
and 4 of the Utah R. App. P.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The Brief of Appellant adequately states the issues
presented for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
With respect to the issues presented for review,
defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion.
Trial courts have considerable discretion in divorce cases in
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases,
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is demonstrated.
1211 (Utah App. 1991).

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,

Further, findings of fact in divorce

appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Id.

The trial court's factual determinations are clearly

erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court has a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.

Cummings v. Cummings.

821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, RULES. ETC.
There is no statutory authority believed by plaintiff
to be wholly determinative of the issues raised on appeal.
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However, the interpretation of §78-45-7.12 Utah Code Ann.. quoted
below, is determinative with respect to child support:
If the combined adjusted gross income
exceeds the highest level specified in the
table, an appropriate and just child support
amount may be ordered, but the amount ordered
may not be less than the highest level
specified in the table for the number of
children due support.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Brief of Appellant provides an adequate statement
of the case.
STATEMENT OP THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED
With the exception of the following additional facts,
the Brief of Appellant provides an adequate statement of the
facts.
Defendant testified that her monthly expenses are
$4,800.00 per month, excluding her car payment which is $396.00,
for a total of $5,196.00 per month.

(FOF, p.3, 18, index 88)

Defendant testified that those expenses include the expenses
attendant to herself, her two children, and the two grandchildren
residing in her home.

(FOF, p.3, 18, index 88)

The trial court

found that the expenses related to the two grandchildren are not
relevant to, nor should they be considered in, the court's award
of alimony and child support.

(FOF, p.3, 18, index 88)

Defendant offered no evidence at trial as to her needs and
expenses excluding and independent of the two grandchildren
residing with her.
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The trial court determined the assets and liabilities
of the parties, accumulated and incurred during the marriage and
outstanding, and made a division thereof, all as provided in
paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact.

(FOF, p.5, Jl3 to p.6,

index 90-91)
The trial court found that the obligation set forth in
subparagraph (r) of paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact, which
is a loan repayable to plaintiff's parents in the amount of
$94,389.00 (which does not include any interest), is a marital
debt of the parties which must be considered in the division of
the marital estate and which accordingly reduces the marital net
worth of the parties to a negative net worth.
index 91)

(FOF, p.6, 1l4,

The debt was incurred from time to time commencing in

1984 and some payments have been made thereon as evidenced by
Defendant's Exhibit 3.

(FOF, p.6, 1l4, to p.7, index 91-92)

The trial court found that since plaintiff was charged
with the responsibility for repayment of that debt to plaintiff's
parents, the division of the marital net worth, as provided for
in paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact, left plaintiff with a
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets being awarded
to defendant have a positive net worth of $17,500.00. (FOF, p.7,
1l4, index 92)

The Court found that imbalance to be necessary

and equitable because at the time of trial plaintiff was the only
party who had earnings with which the liabilities of the parties
could be paid.

g:\wpc\185\00001iri. W51
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The trial court found that because of the substantial
debt of the parties and the resulting negative net worth, the
parties could not afford to maintain and make the mortgage
payments on the marital residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way and
ordered the sale of the same at the earliest possible time.
(FOF# p.8, 1l7# index 93)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court carefully and fully considered the
evidence presented at trial concerning the parties' financial
situation.

After doing so, the trial court specifically found

that the parties cannot afford to maintain and make the mortgage
payments on the marital residence and ordered it sold at the
earliest possible time.
have substantial debt.

The trial court found that the parties
If plaintiff were to be awarded the

marital home, plaintiff's equity would be tied up and unavailable
to pay the marital debts, almost all of which were assigned to
him.

Financial considerations alone are sufficient justification

to order the sale of a marital home.

The record contains ample

evidence to show that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering the sale of the marital home.
The child support for two children at the maximum
income level of $10,000.00 set forth in the statutory child
support table is $1,400.00 per month.

Defendant claims that the

appropriate child support for the two minor children is $1,750.00
per month and arrived at that sum by applying fourteen percent
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(14%) (which is the percentage applied to the $10,000.00
statutory maximum) to plaintiff's gross monthly income of
$12,510.00.

That approach is flawed because it does not consider

the fact that as gross income increases, the percentage of income
required for child support decreases.

If the statutory child

support table were extrapolated, plaintiff's monthly child
support obligation would be $1,500.00 per month.

The trial

court, however, went further and awarded $1,600.00 per month.
In awarding child support, the trial court: (i)
considered defendant's testimony regarding monthly expenses, (ii)
found that the amount of $1,600.00 included some surplus costs
for the children, (iii) found that plaintiff's gross income was
$150,120.00, and (iv) found that plaintiff was not employed.

In

doing so, the trial court acted consistently with statutory
requirements.

Because the trial court acted within statutory law

and made appropriate findings, the trial court did not err in
setting child support at $1,600.00 per month.

Further, the

record contains ample evidence to show that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in establishing that level of child
support.
In awarding alimony, the trial court expressly
considered (i) the financial conditions and needs of the wife,
(ii) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for
herself, and (iii) the ability of the husband to provide support.
Further, the trial court made- detailed findings of fact on each
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factor.

After considering all the relevant evidence, the trial

court awarded defendant $3#000.00 per month after tax income
($1,400.00 in alimony and $1#600.00 per month in child support)
and left plaintiff with after tax. spendable income of $2,884.00
per month.

This division has to the extent possible equalized

the parties' respective standards of living.

Accordingly, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in the award of alimony.
Because plaintiff does not have a common law or
statutory duty to support the minor grandchildren, plaintiff
should not be required to do so, whether the support is labeled
as "child support" or "alimony."

As such, the trial court did

not err by not considering those expenses in awarding child
support and alimony.
Because defendant received substantially more than onehalf (#) of the parties' net worth, defendant's assertion that
the trial court abused its discretion and treated her unfairly is
totally without merit.
The record contains substantial evidence to support the
trial court's determination that the parties have a liability to
plaintiff's parents in the amount of $94,389.00. That evidence
is legally sufficient to support the trial court's factual
determination regarding the existence of that marital liability
to plaintiff's parents.

The trial court's determination

regarding this debt is not clearly erroneous because it is not
against the clear weight of the evidence.
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Defendant's complaint that the trial court made no
order relating to the maintenance of the debt to plaintiff's
parents is without merit.

The trial court assigned this debt to

plaintiff and ordered him to save and hold defendant harmless
therefrom.
In the event that plaintiff substantially prevails on
appeal, the Court should award plaintiff his attorneys' fees and
costs on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT It

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION OR ERR IN ORDERING THE
SALE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE.
Defendant asks this court to award the use and

possession of the marital residence to defendant until the
children attain their majority or until defendant's remarriage or
cohabitation.

In part, defendant justifies this request by

arguing that there are sufficient funds to pay the mortgage
obligation.

Defendant is wrong.

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court specifically
found:
1.

Plaintiff is employed (FOF, p.2, 16, index 87).

2.

Defendant is unemployed (FOF, p.3, 17, index 88).

3.

The parties have negative net worth (FOF, p.6, 1l4,

index 91).
4.

The parties have substantial debt (FOF, p.8, 1l7,

index 93).
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Because plaintiff is employed, and defendant is not,
the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay virtually all of the
marital debts.

Specifically, the Decree of Divorce, a copy of

which is attached hereto as Appendix A, orders plaintiff to "pay
and discharge the following . . . debts and obligations and
shall save and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom:
a.
b.
c.

K-plus loan no. 1 owing to
Pacific Power

(1,762.00)

K-plus loan no. 2 owing to
Pacific Power

(926.00)

Loan payable to Mr. and Mrs.
Paul Baker

d.

(94,389.00)

Loan payable to Pacific Power

e. * Payable to Dr. Hicks

(6,700.00)
(560.00)

f.
g.

Payable to Olivette Furniture
Plaintiff's attorney's fees and
costs incurred in this action

h.

Payable to Defendant's attorney
in this action to apply upon
attorney's fees and costs incurred
by the Defendant in this action
(2,500.00)

i.

The Plaintiff shall pay and
discharge all debts and liabilities
incurred by him since the separation of the parties in May,
1991, and not otherwise provided
for herein and he shall save and
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom."

(DOD, p.9, 1l5 to p.10, index 104-05)

(2,000.00)

The Decree of Divorce also

awarded plaintiff (i) the marital residence subject to the
$143,000.00 mortgage thereon (except as otherwise provided) (DOD,
p.6, 19 to p.7, index 102), (ii) a 1991 GMC subject to the debt
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51
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thereon in the approximate amount of $19,000.00 (DOD, p.8, Jl4,
index 103), and (iii) a 1989 Ford Bronco subject to the debt
thereon in the approximate amount of $10,800.00 (DOD, p.8, 1l4,
index 103).

Further, the Decree orders plaintiff to pay to

defendant child support in the amount of $1,600.00 per month
(DOD, p3, 13, index 98) and alimony in the sum of $1,400.00 per
month (DOD, p.4, ^5, index 99).

As is evident from the

foregoing, plaintiff has substantial monthly obligations.
Plaintiff's monthly cash flow is set forth in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Appendix B.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 shows that the net monthly

cash available to plaintiff is $2,834.00. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2
also shows that the net monthly cash available to defendant is
$3,000.00 (alimony at $1,400.00 per month and child support at
$1,600.00 per month).

Thus, the total net monthly cash flow

available to the parties is $5,834.00.
The Brief of Appellant ("Defendant's Brief") claims
that defendant's monthly living expenses are $5,270.00.

Id. at

p. 23. This amount includes the support of the two grandchildren
living with defendant.

If all of defendant's claimed expenses

were to be met, defendant would require all but $564.00 of the
parties' total net monthly cash flow. As such, it is clear that
there are not sufficient funds available to pay the monthly
mortgage payment of $1,665.00 per month.
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The trial court carefully and fully considered the
evidence presented at trial concerning the parties' financial
situation.

After doing so, the trial court stated from the

bench: "I CANNOT SEE HOW THE PARTIES CAN CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE
RESIDENCE WITHOUT LISTING IT IMMEDIATELY FOR SALE."
11.13-15)

(TR, p.115,

Subsequently, in its written Findings of Fact (a copy

of which is attached hereto as Appendix C) the trial court
specifically found:
"Because of the substantial debt of the parties and the
resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford
to maintain and make the mortgage payments on the
[marital residence! and the same must be sold at the
earliest possible time."
(FOF, p.8, 1l7, index 93; emphasis added.)
The evidence in the record, as set forth in part above,
plainly supports the trial court's conclusion that the marital
home must be sold.

As such, defendant has not met her burden of

showing that the trial court's order in this regard was clearly
erroneous.
Defendant also asserts that she should be awarded the
marital home because it would be in the best interest of the
minor children.

In support of this position, defendant cites

Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1988).

In that

case, the parties were divorced after five years of marriage,
during which they had two children.

Marital assets were meager.

The principal asset was a three-bedroom house, located on ten and
one-half acres, in which the family had lived during the
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marriage.

The home had been in the husband's family for two

generations.

The wife was on public assistance, had limited job

experience and was unlikely to earn more than minimum wage.
After considering the various circumstances of the
case, the Peterson court held:
In the present case, the only resource
available to support the children is the
family home. It makes no sense for plaintiff
and the children to become public charges
while defendant retains title to and
possession of the family home for his own
purposes. . . .
Further, allowing the children to remain
in the family home would serve their
emotional best interests by maintaining their
roots and security and, thus, helping to
ameliorate the trauma of the divorce.
Therefore, in light of the total
circumstances. we award the exclusive
occupancy of the house to plaintiff until she
remarries or until the children reach their
majority, marry, or otherwise become
independent of plaintiff.
(748 P.2d at 595-96; emphasis added.)
The following facts distinguish the case at hand from
Peterson:
1.

There is no evidence that the marital residence

has been in the family for generations affording the children
with a sense of roots.
2.

Defendant is not on public assistance and will

earn more than minimum wage.

In fact, defendant is a trained and

qualified teacher in good health and, while uncertified, can recertify upon completion of three (3) academic hours of training.
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Defendant has worked during most of the majority of the marriage
as a teacher or secretary.
3.

(FOF, p.3, 17, index 88)

The marital residence is not the only resource

available to support the children.

Because defendant is

receiving a total of $3,000.00 per month in combined child
support and alimony, there are clearly resources to provide
suitable housing for the children.
4.
two years.

The parties have lived in the home for less than

The home is two or three times the size of the

parties' former home (TR, p.70, 1.24 to p.71, 1.1), and is valued
$100,000.00 more than the parties' prior home. (TR, p.70, 1.16;
TR, p.114, 11.7-8)
5.

The trial court in the instant case found

defendant's testimony regarding the marital residence confusing:
JUDGE YOUNG:
YOU KNOW, THE INTERESTING THING
THAT I RECALL ABOUT THE TESTIMONY OF [DEFENDANT] IN
RELATION TO THAT HOME IS SHE NOW COMES FORWARD AND SAYS
SHE WANTS THE HOME. AT THE TIME THAT SHE MOVED TO
SOUTH JORDAN, AS I RECALL HER TESTIMONY, SHE DID NOT
WANT TO MOVE TO SOUTH JORDAN. IF SHE HAD HER CHOICE
SHE STATED SHE WOULD LIVE ON THE EAST SIDE WITH A
SWIMMING POOL, BUT NOW SHE WANTS COUNTRY LIVING. WHAT
AM I TO CONCLUDE IS HER REAL DESIRE? IT SEEMS TO ME
THAT THE TESTIMONY IN RELATION TO THE HOME IS BEING
ADJUSTED BY ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT. I CAN'T SEE WHY SHE
DOESN'T WANT TO SELL THAT HOME THAT BEARS A $143,000.00
MORTGAGE THAT HAS BEEN A HOME THAT IS FAR IN EXCESS OF
WHAT THE PARTIES CAN EFFECTIVELY AFFORD, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF DIVORCE, BUT NOW SHE
WANTS TO TELL ME THAT SHE WANTS TO KEEP THE HOME
BECAUSE SHE AND THE GRANDCHILDREN AND THE.CHILDREN, TWO
CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN, RESIDE IN THE HOME, BUT
THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT THE HOME AND SHE'D RATHER LIVE ON
THE EAST SIDE WITH A SWIMMING POOL. TO ME, THE
TESTIMONY BECOMES SOMEWHAT CONFUSING.
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(TR, p.105, 1.20 to p.106, 1.13; emphasis added)
6.

The trial court in the instant case specifically

found that the parties cannot afford to maintain and make the
mortgage payments on the marital residence and that it must be
sold at the earliest possible time.

(FOF, p.8, 1l7, index 93)

Due to the foregoing circumstances, it is plain that
Peterson does not control the case at issue. The above facts
clearly support the trial court's order that the marital
residence be sold.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The court should note that financial considerations
alone are sufficient justification to order sale of a marital
home.

In Blackman v. Blackman. 517 N.Y.S.2d 167 (A.D. 2 Dept.

1987) the trial court ordered the sale of the marital residence
in order to provide for the spouses' future living expenses and
to pay marital debts. The appellate court affirmed, stating:
Even though exclusive possession of the
marital residence is usually granted to the
spouse who has custody of the minor children
of the marriage . . . , this need of the
custodial parent to occupy the marital
residence is weighed against the financial
need of the parties for a quick sale of the
marital residence.
Id. at 170 (citations omitted).

The appellate court noted the

evidence supported the trial court's finding that the spouses'
salaries were insufficient for their living expenses and that the
marital residence was a source of funds to meet these expenses
and satisfy marital debts.

g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51

-13-

Similarly, the trial court in this case stated that
11

[b] ecause of the substantial debt of the parties and the

resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford to
maintain and make the payments on the [marital residence] and the
same must be sold at the earliest possible time.
index 93)

(FOF, p.8, 117,

This finding makes clear the parties do not have the

funds to make the mortgage payments. Additionally, if defendant
were to be awarded the marital home, plaintiff's equity would be
"tied up forever."

(TR, p.96, 1.9)

That would be inappropriate

considering the fact that plaintiff has the responsibility to
discharge essentially all of the marital debts.

Plaintiff is

obviously in need of funds to satisfy those debts.
At bottom, the record contains ample evidence to show
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the
sale of the marital home. Accordingly, defendant has failed to
establish that the trial court's factual determination in this
connection was clearly erroneous, that is, that the trial court's
finding is in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence or
creates a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.
POINT lis

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS PENDING SALE OF
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE.
After some discussion regarding the amount of the

mortgage payment, the trial court ruled:
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we-

JUDGE YOUNG:
WHATEVER [THE MORTGAGE
PAYMENT] IS I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT THE
DEFENDANT PAY $1,000.00 TOWARDS IT AND THE
PLAINTIFF PAY THE REMAINDER UNTIL THE HOME IS
SOLD. SO THAT WAY IT GIVES THE DEFENDANT
SOME RELIEF ON THE MORTGAGE PAYMENT.
NOW/ THAT WILL GO ON FROM APRIL 1ST
THROUGH SEPTEMBER, THROUGH THE SEPTEMBER
PAYMENT. THEREFORE, THEREAFTER THE DEFENDANT
SHALL BE OBLIGATED TO BEAR THAT PAYMENT. SO
I'M ANTICIPATING THAT THE HOME--I WANT THE
PARTIES TO BE MOTIVATED TO SELL THE HOME SO
THAT THEY CAN GET RID OF THAT HORRENDOUS
LIABILITY.
NOW, THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE ALIMONY
FIGURE THAT--WELL, PENDING THE SALE OF THE
HOME THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE OBLIGATED TO PAYMR. COWLEY:

PLAINTIFF.

JUDGE YOUNG:
EXCUSE ME, PLAINTIFF.
YES. THANK YOU. PLAINTIFF SHALL BE
OBLIGATED TO PAY $1,200.00 IN ALIMONY. AT
THE SALE OF THE HOME THE ALIMONY SHALL
CONTINUE AND SHALL REMAIN AS A PERMANENT
AWARD OF ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,400.00 A
MONTH.
(TR, p.116, 1.12 to p.114, 1.6; emphasis added)
Defendant's Brief argues that (i) there was no evidence
"that the defendant would obstruct or prevent the sale of the
marital residence, warranting the trial court's order that the
defendant should bear the entire mortgage payment if the home did
not sell by October 1, 1992," and (ii) "the court order serves as
a punishment of the defendant, rather than a motivation."
(Defendant's Brief, p.21)

Defendant is mistaken.

The trial court recognized that the "horrendous
liability" (TR, p.116, 1.22) associated with the marital home
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must be eliminated as soon as possible.

The trial court ordered

a mortgage payment allocation which was designed to motivate the
parties to sell the home. Defendant claims that there was no
evidence that defendant would obstruct or prevent the sale of the
marital home.

History has demonstrated the court's wisdom in

this matter because it is now apparent, as reflected in a
collateral proceeding in this case, that defendant intends to and
in fact has prevented the sale of the marital home.1
POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE
DEFENDANT CHILD SUPPORT AT THE
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
DOLLARS ($1,600.00) PER MONTH.

Defendant argues that the trial court's award of child
support in the amount of $1,600.00 per month is "simply too low."
Defendant's Brief, p.26.

Defendant also asserts that the trial

court's findings are inadequate.
In large part, defendant's analysis relies upon Allred
v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990).

Defendant, however,

fails to note that Allred predates the statutory guidelines now
in effect. At the time of the dispute in Allred. §78-45-7(2)
Utah Code Ann. (1987) required trial courts to consider all

\As the Court is aware, on Tuesday, September 15, 1992,
defendant's Motion to Stay the portions of the trial court judgment
awarding the marital residence to plaintiff and ordering the
immediate sale thereof came on for hearing before the Court of
Appeals. A potential buyer had made an offer to purchase the
marital home. The Court of Appeals granted defendant's Motion to
Stay.
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relevant factors in determining child support, including but not
limited to the following:
(a) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c)

the ability of the obligor to earn;

(d)

the ability of the obligee to earn;

(e)

the need of the obligee;

(f)

the age of the parties;

(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
Allred, supra. at ill.

In 1987 it was proper to require trial

courts to consider the above factors because the 1987 Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act (a copy of which is attached
hereto as Appendix D) did not contain a child support table.
The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act has been
amended since Allred.

Section 78-45-7 Utah Code Ann, now

provides in part:
(2) If no prior court order exists, or
a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of
prospective support shall require each party
to file a proposed award of child support
using the guidelines before an order awarding
child support or modifying an existing award
may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient
evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all
relevant factors, including but not limited
to:
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(a) the standard of living
and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and
income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the
obligor to earji;
(d) the ability of the
obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee,
the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties;
and
(g) the responsibilities of
the obligor and the obligee for the
support of others.
Thus, it is clear that the factors listed in §78-45-7(3) only
apply if the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the
guidelines.

Rebuttal is discussed in §78-45-7.2(3):

A written finding or specific finding on
the record supporting the conclusion that
complying with a provision of the guidelines
or ordering an award amount resulting from
use of the guidelines would be unjust,
inappropriate, or not in the best interest of
a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
The case at hand does not involve a situation where rebutting the
guidelines is at issue.

Therefore, the factors listed in §78-45-

7(3) are not applicable to this case.
The statute at issue in this case is §78-45-7.12, which
provides:
If the combined adjusted gross income
exceeds the highest level specified in the
table, an appropriate and just child support
amount may be ordered, but the amount ordered
may not be less than the highest level
specified in the table for the number of
children due support.
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Defendant, in effect, argues that if the combined adjusted gross
income exceeds the highest level specified in the table, the
court must consider the factors contained in §78-45-7(3).
Section §78-45-7.12 does not say that.

If the legislature had

intended that the factors contained in §78-45-7(3) are to be
applied when gross income exceeds the highest level in the table,
the legislature would have said so. All that the legislature in
fact required is that "an appropriate and just child support
amount may be ordered, but the amount ordered may not be less
than the highest level specified in the table for the number of
children due support."

That is exactly what the trial court did

in this case after considering the evidence at trial.
Defendant gave the following testimony at trial:
Q
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) MRS. BAKER, HAVE YOU
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY GUIDELINES AND THE CHILD
SUPPORT OBLIGATION?
A

YES.

Q
AND YOU'RE AWARE THAT THE AMOUNT OF
INCOME MADE BY MR. BAKER IS IN EXCESS OF
$10,000.00 AND, THEREFORE, NOT ON THE CHILD
SUPPORT SCHEDULE.
A

YES.

Q
BASED UPON THE GUIDELINES AT THE TOP
FIGURE OF 1,400, WHICH IS 14 PERCENT OF
$10,000.00, WOULD IT BE YOUR DESIRE THAT THAT
SAME 14 PERCENT FIGURE BE USED TO COMPUTE THE
CHILD SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER?
A

YES.

Q
AND WHAT IS THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT
THEN THAT YOU BELIEVE IS APPROPRIATE?
g:\wpc\185\00001iri. W51
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A

1,750 A MONTH.

Q
AND ARE YOUR EXPENSES--ARE YOUR EXPENSES
SUCH THAT THAT 1,750 WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR
THE CARE OF YOUR CHILDREN?
A

YES, UM, YES.

(TR, p.84, 1.8 to p.85, 1. 2)
It is clear from the foregoing that defendant arrived
at the sum of $1,750.00 by applying fourteen percent (14%) (which
is the percentage applied to the $10,000.00 maximum income in the
statutory table) to plaintiff's gross monthly income of
$12,510.00.

The flaw with that approach is that it does not

consider that fact that as gross income increases, the percentage
of income required for child support decreases.

The following

income and child support levels from the statutory table are
illustrative (child support ie for two children):

Gross Income
$ 7,500
10,000

Child Support as
a Percentage
of Income
16%
14

Child Support
$1,205
1,400

If this table were extrapolated so as to apply the same two
percent (2%) decrease to an income increase of $2,500.00, the
resulting child support would be as follows:

Gross Income
$12,500

Child Support as
a Percentage
of Income
12%

Child Support
$1,500

Under this extrapolation approach, plaintiff's monthly child
support obligation would be $1,500.00 per month because his gross
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monthly income is $12,510 per month.

The trial court, however,

went further and awarded $1,600-00 per month.
Defendant complains that the trial court did not make
adequate findings to support defendant's child support award.
Defendant is wrong.

At trial plaintiff suggested that he pay

$1,600.00 per month in child support.

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

The trial court specifically found that amount included some
surplus:
JUDGE YOUNG:
EIGHT AND NINE THIS YEAR.
AND THE TOTAL COST--THEY HAVE OFFERED
$1,600.00 A MONTH, PLUS OR MINUS A FEW
DOLLARS. I THINK IT WAS A LITTLE BIT OVER.
BUT THE CHILDREN DON'T COST $800.00 A MONTH
FOR FOOD, CLOTHING AND SHELTER. SO THERE'S
GOT TO BE SOME SURPLUS IN THAT.
(TR, p.109, 11.3-8)

Additionally, the Findings of Fact provide:

8.
The Defendant testified that her monthly
expenses are $4,800.00 per month, excluding
her car payment which is $396.00, for a total
of $5,196.00 per month. The Defendant
testified that those expenses include the
expenses attendant to herself, her two
children, and the two grandchildren residing
in her home. The expenses related to the two
grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should
they be considered in, the Court's award of
alimony and child support.
9.
Premised and predicated upon the total
gross compensation of the Plaintiff
(including bonuses and car allowance) of
$150,120.00 and further premised and
predicated upon the fact that the Defendant
is currently unemployed and currently has no
income, reasonable child support to be paid
by Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of
the two (2) children is $1,600.00 per month.
The income level of the Plaintiff exceeds the
guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann.
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§78-45-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be
a reasonable sum.
(FOF, p.3, 18 to p.4, 19, index 88-89)
In doing so, the trial court acted consistently with statutory
requirements.
Thus, it is clear that in awarding child support the
trial court: (i) considered defendant's testimony regarding
monthly expenses, (.ii) found that the amount of $1,600.00
included some surplus costs for the children, (iii) found that
plaintiff's gross income was $150,120.00, and (iv) found that
plaintiff was not employed.
that

The trial court specifically stated

lf

[t]he income level of the Plaintiff exceeds the guideline

amounts set Eorth in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-1 and the Court finds
$1,600.00 to be a reasonable pum."

(FOF, p.4, 59, index 89)

That is wholly consistent with the mandate set forth in §78-457.12.
Because the trial court acted in full compliance with
§78-45-7.12 and made appropriate findings, the trial court did
not err in setting child support at $1,600.00 per month.
Further, as indicated above, the record contains ample evidence
to show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
establishing that level of child support. Accordingly, defendant
has failed to establish that the trial court's factual
determination regarding the award of child support was clearly
erroneous.
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING THE DEFENDANT ALIMONY AT THE
LEVEL OF ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS
($1,400.00) PER MONTH.
A.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE
TO SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AWARD AND THE ALIMONY
AWARD IS ADEQUATE.
The trial court awarded defendant the sum of One
Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($1,400.00) per month as and for
alimony. (DOD, p.4, 15, index 99)

Defendant claims that

$1,400.00 per month is inadequate and that the trial court's
findings of fact are inadequate.

Defendant is mistaken on both

counts.
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the
Supreme Court of Utah stated that the criteria to be "considered
in determining a reasonable award for support and maintenance
include the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself,
and the ability of the husband to provide support."
12.

Id. at 411-

The three factors articulated in English must be considered

in fixing a reasonable alimony award.
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

Further, "[t]he trial court must make

sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a
reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary
determination was rationally based upon these three factors."
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah App. 1991).

Finally, "[a]n

alimony award should . . . to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51
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level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage."

Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, (Utah

1988) . As explained below, the trial court followed the mandates
of English. Jones. Bell and Gardner.
The trial court's Findings of Fact state in part:
6.
The Plaintiff is employed and his
current annual gross compensation, including
car allowance and anticipated bonuses, is
$150,120,00. The Plaintiff has been the
primary wage earner during the marriage. The
parties' incomes for the previous years,
including bonuses and relocation
reimbursement, are as follows: 1990 $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 - $111,715;
1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149.
7.
The Defendant is an educated, trained
and qualified teacher in the Utah public
school system and she is in good health. She
last worked and last taught a full contract
year for the school year 1989-1990. She has
worked during the majority of the parties'
marriage as a school teacher or secretary.
She is currently uncertified, but can
recertify upon completion of three (3)
academic hours of training which she can
readily obtain between now and the beginning
of the 1992-1993 school year. The Defendant
is currently unemployed and presently has no
income.
8.
The Defendant testified that her monthly
expenses are $4,800.00 per month, excluding
her car payment which is $396.00, for a total
of $5,196.00 per month. The Defendant
testified that those expenses include the
expenses attendant to herself, her two
children, and the two grandchildren residing
in her home. The expenses related to the two
grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should
they be considered in, the Court's award of
alimony and child support.
9.
Premised and predicated upon the total
gross compensation of the Plaintiff
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(including bonuses and car allowance) of
$150,120.00 and further premised and
predicated upon the fact that the Defendant
is currently unemployed and currently has no
income, reasonable child support to be paid
by Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of
the two (2) children is $1,600.00 per month.
The income level of the Plaintiff exceeds the
guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§78-45-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be
a reasonable sum. Given the Plaintiff's
current income and the fact that the
Defendant is not currently employed and is
without income and given the debts and
expenses of the parties, most of which must
be paid by the Plaintiff and given the needs
of the Plaintiff and the Defendant,
reasonable alimony to be paid by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant is $1,400.00 per
month.
(FOF, p.2, 16 to p.4, 19)
The above Findings of Fact make it abundantly clear
that the trial court in awarding alimony expressly considered (i)
the financial conditions and needs of the wife, (ii) the ability
of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and (iii)
the ability of the husband to provide support.

It should be

noted that even though defendant did not present any evidence at
trial concerning her needs, the trial court expressly considered
defendant's testimony that she, the two minor children and the
two grandchildren have total monthly expenses of $5,196.00.
The above Findings of Fact also plainly show that the trial court
made sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to
enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's
discretionary determination was rationally based upon those three
factors.

The only remaining question, then, is whether the trial
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court equalized the parties' respective standards of living to
the extent possible.
Defendant's argument regarding the parties' respective
post-divorce incomes does not take into account all of the
evidence presented at trial.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, on the other

hand, sets forth a .complete cash flow analysis of plaintiff's
earnings.

That Exhibit begins with plaintiff's gross income and

then subtracts therefrom PICA, various withholdings, the debts
assigned to plaintiff, child support, alimony, and state and
federal taxes:
Annual
Plaintiff's current gross annual income
Includes car allowance of $7,800 and
average bonus
Less FICA withheld
Withholding for health and accident insurance
Withholding for accidental death
Withholding for dental insurance
Withholding for life insurance
Withholding for vision insurance
Car payment on GMC at $452.00 per month
Car payment on Bronco at $264.00 per month
Monthly payment to Olivette Furniture - $200.00
Repayment of K-plus no. 1 loan @ $135.00 per month
Repayment of K-plus no. 2 loan @ $57.00 per month
Pay Dr. Hicks at $25.00 per month
Payment to Paul Baker at $750.00 per month
Pay Pacific Power at $400.00 per month
Child support for two children at $1,600.00
per month

$150,120.00
(5,115.00)
(468.00)
(210.00)
(192.00)
(821.00)
(120.00)
(5,424.00)
(3,168.00)
(2,400.00)
(1,620.00)
(684.00)
(300.00)
(12,000.00)
(4,800.00)

Balance available for tax and support of the parties

$ 93,514.00

Suggested alimony for Mrs. Baker at $1,400.00
per month

(16,800.00)

Federal and state taxes payable by Mr. Baker
calculated as follows:
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(19,284.00)

Gross income
$150,120.00
Less alimony
(16,800.00)
Less 2 personal exemptions
and itemized deductions (5.000.00)
Taxable income $128,320.00
Federal and state tax at
combined estimated rate
Federal & state income tax

x.33
($42.345.00)

Net annual cash available for Mr. Baker

$34,009.00

Net monthly cash available for Mr. Baker

$2,834.00

The net result is that even though plaintiff's gross monthly
income is $12,510.00, after plaintiff meets all of the above
monthly obligations, plaintiff has only $2,834.00 per month to
meet his expenses and defendant has $3,000.00 per month to meet
her expenses.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 also shows defendant's cash flow:
Month

Annual

Net cash for Mrs. Baker and children
Child support
Alimony

$1,600.00 $19,284.00
1.400.00 16.800.00
$3.000.00 $36.084.00
With alimony and child support at this level
and with Mrs. Baker filing as head of
household and taking the children as
exemptions, she will not incur Federal or
State income tax liabilities.

Accordingly, defendant has $3,000.00 per month to meet the needs
of herself and the two children.

This is more than one-half (&)

of the parties' monthly cash flow.
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Apparently, defendant now takes the position that only
alimony, and not child support, should be taken into account when
the trial court is equalizing the parties' respective standards
of living.
trial.

That is not what defendant's counsel maintained at

At trial, defendant's counsel argued as follows:
AND I THINK THE COURT HAS TO LOOK AT THE
RELATIVE EARNINGS REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT
SHE CAN AND WILL AND WANTS TO GO OUT AND
WORK, BUT THE COURT NEEDS TO LOOK AT WHAT'S
GOING TO HAPPEN AFTERWARDS AND THE FACT THAT
WHEN SHE'S AWARDED CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
THAT IT SHOULD BE A REASONABLE AMOUNT AND
THAT IT SHOULD EQUALIZE THOSE PARTIES'
INCOMES. THANK YOU.

(TR, p.110, 11.17-23; emphasis added)
this assertion.

Defendant was correct in

It is reasonable and proper for the trial court

to take into account both alimony and child support in equalizing
the parties' incomes.

This is entirely consistent with the

directive that the trial court should to the extent possible
"equalize the parties' respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard
enjoyed during the marriage."

Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076,

1081 (Utah 1988).
In the instant case, the trial court considered all the
evidence at trial and then equitably divided plaintiff's income
between the parties.

The division allocates $2,834.00 per month

to plaintiff and $3,000.00 per month to defendant ($1,400.00 in
alimony and $1,600.00 per month in child support).

The fact that

defendant was awarded more than half of the cash flow was
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appropriate given that defendant has custody of the two children.
This division has to the extent possible equalized the parties'
respective standards of living and maintained them at a level as
close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in the award of alimony.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE EXPENSES ATTENDANT TO THE
GRANDCHILDREN.
At trial plaintiff testified that the parties'
granddaughter, Lacey, had been living with the parties for
approximately five years, and that Lacey's mother had also lived
with the parties for three or four years during that time.
p.43, 11.19-21; p.44, 12-18)

(TR,

The parties' grandson, Christopher,

had lived with the parties for about one month while the parties
were living together.

(TR, p.46, 11.10-13)

Plaintiff testified

that he did not request that defendant stay at home and take care
of the grandchildren.

(TR, p.45, 1.25 to p.46, 1.9)

Plaintiff

also testified that he did not encourage Christopher moving into
the marital home, and, that due to emotional problems that the
grandchildren and their mother may suffer, plaintiff would like
to see both of the grandchildren go back with their mother.

(TR,

p.46, 1.25 to p.47,- 1.12)
Plaintiff's counsel objected to defendant's testimony
regarding the grandchildren on the grounds of irrelevancy and
immateriality.
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The trial court sustained

that objection.

(TR, p.63, 11.5-6)

Defendant's counsel made a

proffer of defendant's testimony regarding the grandchildren.
(TR, p.89, 1.19 to p. 90, 1.9)
The trial court found that "[t]he expenses related to
the two grandchildren are not relevant to, nor should they be
considered in, the Court's award of alimony and child support."
(FOF, p.3, 58, index 88)
Plaintiff does not have a common law or statutory duty
to provide support for the parties' grandchildren.
the duty to support their children.

Parents have

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 to

4.
Defendant "does not contend that the plaintiff owes a
duty of child support for the grandchildren in defendant's home."
Defendant's Brief, p.37. Defendant is correct in this
contention.

Defendant, however, attempts to make an end run

around the fact that plaintiff does not have a duty to support
the grandchildren.

Defendant does so by claiming that expenses

attendant to the grandchildren should be included in her alimony
award.

As such, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in

not permitting defendant's testimony relating to the
grandchildren.

Because plaintiff does not have a duty to support

the minor grandchildren, plaintiff should not be required to do
so, whether the support is labeled as "child support" or
"alimony."
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Because testimony relating to the grandchildren is not
relevant to this action, the trial court did not err by excluding
defendant's proffered testimony relating to the grandchildren.
The Court should note that defendant's proffered testimony did
not provide information relating to the expenses of the minor
grandchildren.
In sum, because the grandchildren's expenses are not
relevant to this case, the trial court did not err by not
considering such expenses in awarding child support and alimony.
POINT V:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR OR ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL
ESTATE.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 contains a statement of the

parties' assets and liabilities and plaintiff's suggested
division thereof.

(A copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is attached

hereto as Appendix E.)

At trial, plaintiff's counsel made the

following offer of proof which was accepted by the court:
LET ME TRY BY WAY OF PROFFER, IF I MAY, TO
SAVE US ALL SOME TIME, IT WOULD BE MR.
BAKER'S TESTIMONY THAT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1,
WHICH IS ENTITLED STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES, WAS PREPARED UNDER HIS
SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION AT MY OFFICE, THAT
IT CONTAINS ALL OF THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
OF WHICH HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE AND THAT IT ALSO
CONTAINS A PROPOSED DIVISION, HIS SUGGESTED
DIVISION. AND THAT WOULD BE HIS TESTIMONY IF
I HAD ASKED HIM TO TESTIFY ABOUT THIS
EXHIBIT. BASED ON THAT PROFFER, IF THAT'S
ACCEPTABLE TO MS. WILLIAMS, I WOULD OFFER
EXHIBIT 1.
(TR, p. 16, 1.18 to p. 17, 1.2)

Defendant's counsel had no

objection and the trial court received Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
g:\wpc\185\00001iri.W51

-31-

(TR,17, 11.2-7)

As such, the trial court had evidence of all of

the parties' assets and liabilities, and their respective values
and amounts.
Defendant also provided a schedule of marital assets
and her proposed division thereof, which was designated as
Defendant's Exhibit 7.

A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 7 is

attached hereto as Appendix F.
Based on the evidence at trial, the trial court made
the following findings regarding the parties' assets and
liabilities:
13. The assets and (liabilities) of the parties
accumulated and incurred during the marriage and
currently outstanding and an equitable division thereof
is as follows:
No.

Description

Mrs. Baker

(a)

Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way

(b)

Mortgage on residence

(c)

Household furnishings and

$183,000.00
(143,000.00)

fixtures at residence

$15,000.00

(d)

2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah

(e)

1990 Ford Bronco operated
by Mrs. Baker

15,000.00
6,000.00

17,000.00

(f)

Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00)

(g)

1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker

(h)

Purchase debt on 1991 GMC

(i)

1989 Ford Bronco

(j)

Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco

(k)

Horse - 2 year filly
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(1)

Horse - D.B. Cooper

1,500.00

(ni)

Garden, power & hand tools

2,000.00

(n)

Tack for horses

400.00

(o)

U.S. Savings Bonds

600.00

(p)

K-plus loan no. 1 owing to
Pacific Power

(q)

(1,762.00)

K-plus loan no. 2 owing to
Pacific Power

(926.00)

(r)

Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents

(s>

Loan payable to Pacific Power

(t)

Payable to Dr. Hicks

(u)

Payable to Olivette Furniture

(v)

Estimated attorney's fees for
Mr. Baker
Estimated attorney's fees for
Mrs. Baker
Clothing and personal effects
each party - not valued -

(w)
(x)

(6,700.00)
(560.00)

NET VALUES
(y)

(94,389.00)

(2,000.00)
(2,500.00)
(2,500.00)
NV

NV

517.500.00 5(43.637.00)

Together with an equal division between the parties of all
401K, pension and retirement funcis of both parties per
appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations and other
necessary orders.

(FOF, b.5 113 to p.6, index 90-91)

As i s evident from the above

findincjS# the trial court gave careful Qonsideration to all of
the parties' assets and liabilities.
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990),
the coiirt held that, absent special circumstances, each party is
entitled to fifty percent of the marital property.
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As is readily

apparent from the above "equitable division,n the parties have a
negative net worth.

Thus, under Dunn, each party should have

been awarded one-half (#) of the parties' negative net worth.
That, however, was not done. According to the division of the
marital net worth, as reflected in 1l3 quoted above, plaintiff
was left with a negative net worth of $43,637.00, while defendant
was awarded assets such that she had a positive net worth of
$17,500.00.

From plaintiff's perspective, this division of net

worth falls short of the equal division called for in Dunn.

Yet

it is not plaintiff who is complaining; defendant is. Because
defendant received substantially more than one-half (%) of the
parties' net worth, defendant's assertions that the trial court
abused its discretion and treated her unfairly are totally
without merit.
It appears that defendant's major complaint with
respect to the property division concerns the parties' loan
payable to plaintiff's parents in the amount of $94,389.00.
Apparently, defendant believes that the trial court erred in
finding that this obligation is a marital liability.

The

evidence presented at trial, however, clearly shows that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding:
1.

Exhibit 1 clearly lists this obligation as a

marital liability.
2.

Plaintiff's testimony on this subject can be found

in the trial transcript at the following pages:
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TR, p . 2 1 , 1 1 . 2 - 2 1 :

Q
(BY MR. COWLEY) NOW, ON PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT 1, MR. BAKER, I NOTICE A LINE NUMBER
18 SAYS LOAN PAYABLE TO YOUR PARENTS,
$94,389.00.
A

YES, SIR.

Q
AND IN FACT, YOU AND MRS. BAKER OWE THAT
TO YOUR MOTHER AND DAD.
A
IT.

YES, WE DO. AND MY MOTHER AND DAD WANT

Q

THEY'VE ASKED FOR IT?

A

YES.

Q
AND THAT'S MONEY THAT THEY ADVANCED TO
YOU AND MRS. BAKER OVER MANY YEARS; IS THAT
CORRECT?
A

YES, THAT'S CORRECT.

Q
IT?

AND YOUR FATHER KEPT VERY CLOSE TRACK OF

A

VERY CLOSE.

Q

HAS A SCHEDULE?

A

YES.

Q
KEEPS UP WITH IT. IT'S ALSO TRUE THAT
YOU'VE MADE SOME PAYMENTS ON THAT OVER THE
YEARS.
A
THAT'S CORRECT.
I COULD MAKE.

TR, p . 3 5 ,

I'VE MADE WHAT PAYMENTS

11.8-16:

Q
[BY MS. WILLIAMS] MR. BAKER, YOU
INDICATED THAT YOUR FATHER KEPT A JOURNAL OR
LEDGER OF PAYMENTS ON THE LOAN THAT YOU
TESTIFIED TO. DID YOU KEEP A RECORD OF
PAYMENTS MADE?
g:\wpc\185\0O001iri.W51
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A

YES.

Q
AND I JUST PUT BEFORE YOU, I BELIEVE
THAT'S DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 3. DOES THAT
EXHIBIT--CAN YOU TELL ME IF THAT EXHIBIT SETS
FORTH THE PAYMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE BY YOU
TO YOUR FATHER?
A

I BELIEVE SO, YES.

Q
AND DOES THAT ACCURATELY REFLECT
PAYMENTS MADE SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE
OBLIGATION IN 1984?
A

YES.

(A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 3 is attached hereto as Appendix
H.)

TR, p.36, 11.4-13:
Q
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) MR. BAKER, YOU
TESTIFIED THAT YOUR WIFE KNEW ABOUT THE FUNDS
THAT YOU BORROWED FROM YOUR FATHER.
A

YES.

Q
DID SHE KNOW ABOUT EACH TIME YOU
BORROWED MONEY?
A

YOU MEAN SPECIFIC?

A
AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT SHE MAY HAVE
AND SHE MAY NOT HAVE. THERE WERE TIMES WHEN
SHE BORROWED THE MONEY FROM MY PARENTS.

TR, p.38, 1. 19 to p.39, 1.5:
Q
[BY MS. WILLIAMS] YOU MADE NO PAYMENTS
IN 1990. IS THERE SOME REASON YOU DIDN'T?
A
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NO MONEY.

Q
YOU MADE ONE PAYMENT IN '91 AND THAT WAS
IN DECEMBER OF, JUST RECENTLY, DECEMBER OF
LAST YEAR; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

THAT'S CORRECT.

Q
IS THERE SOME REASON THAT YOU MADE THAT
PAYMENT AFTER HAVING NOT MADE A PAYMENT FOR
SEVERAL YEARS?
A
TWO REASONS. ONE IS I HAD THE MONEY AND
THE SECOND IS I'M GETTING A LOT OF PRESSURE
FROM MY PARENTS TO PAY 'EM BACK. MY FATHER'S
CLOSE TO 72 YEARS OLD.

TR, p.47, 1.18 to p. 48, 1.15:
Q
[BY MS. WILLIAMS] WHAT WOULD BE YOUR
INTENTIONS REGARDING PAYING BACK THE AMOUNTS
THAT YOU SAY ARE OWED TO YOUR DAD?
A

MY INTENTIONS IS TO PAY MY FATHER BACK.

Q

HOW?

A
CASH. AS I'VE DONE IN THE PAST. IF
THERE'S SOMETHING THAT I CAN TRADE HIM FOR
CREDIT. THAT TYPE OF THING. I HOPED TO PAY
HIM AROUND $1,000.00 A MONTH IF I CAN MAKE
IT.
Q
WELL, YOU MADE ONE PAYMENT IN 1991 SO IS
THERE A POSSIBILITY YOU'LL ONLY MAKE ONE
PAYMENT IN '92?
A
WELL, NO. I'M MAKING THE PAYMENTS AS I
CAN GET THE MONEY. IF I DON'T HAVE ANY MONEY
I CAN'T PAY HIM.
Q
DO YOU HAVE MORE DEBT NOW THAN YOU HAD
IN 1984?
A

YES.

Q
IN RELATION TO YOUR INCOME DO YOU HAVE
MORE DEBT?
A
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Q
DO YOU THINK YOUR FATHER WOULD BE
SATISFIED WITH LESS THAN A $1,000.00 A MONTH
PAYMENT?
A
THERE'S A POTENTIAL. BUT AS I MENTIONED
EARLIER, MY FATHER'S RETIRED, HE'S 72 YEARS
OLD. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH LONGER MY FATHER
IS GOING TO BE AROUND. HE LOOKS AT THIS AS A
COMMITMENT. HE GAVE US THE MONEY AND WE TOLD
HIM WE'D PAY IT BACK.

3.

The following exchange occurred at trial between

the trial judge and defendant's counsel:
JUDGE YOUNG:
OKAY. MS. WILLIAMS, DO I
RECALL CORRECTLY THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN THE
DEPOSITION OF HIS PARENTS IN THE DISCOVERY
PORTION OF THIS CASE?
MS. WILLIAMS:

I DID, YOUR HONOR.

JUDGE YOUNG:
AND THAT IT WOULD BE
THEIR TESTIMONY THAT IF THEY WERE CALLED TO
TESTIFY THEY WOULD STATE THAT THIS IS AN
OBLIGATION THAT THEY INTEND TO HAVE RE-PAID?
MS. WILLIAMS:

THAT WAS THEIR TESTIMONY.

(TR, p. 43, 11.7-14)

The Court should note that plaintiff's father is 72
years old and that it will take approximately eight years to
retire this debt with monthly payments of $1,000.00 per month
without interest.

At that time plaintiff's father will be

approximately 80 years old.
Based upon the evidence at trial, the trial court made
the following findings of fact:
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14. The obligation set forth in subparagraph (r) of
paragraph 14 above, which is a loan repayable to the
Plaintiff's parents- in the amount of $94,389.00 (which
does not include any interest), is a marital debt of
the parties which must be considered in the division of
the marital estate and which accordingly reduces the
marital net worth of the parties to a negative net
worth. The debt was incurred from time to time
commencing in 1984 and some payments have been made
thereon as evidenced by Defendant's Exhibit 3. Since
Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility for
repayment of that debt to Plaintiff's parents, the
division .of the marital net worth, as provided for in
paragraph 14 above, leaves the Plaintiff with a
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets
being awarded to the Defendant have a positive net
worth of $17,500.00. The Court finds this imbalance to
be necessary and equitable because the Plaintiff is the
only party who has earnings with which the liabilities
of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 14 above, can
be paid.
(FOF, p.6 114 to p.7, index 92)
The evidence set forth above is legally sufficient to
support the trial court's factual determination regarding the
existence of the marital debt to plaintiff's parents.

The trial

court's determination is not clearly erroneous because it is not
against the clear weight of the evidence.
Defendant complains that the trial court made "no order
relating to the maintenance of [the debt to plaintiff's
parents]."

Defendant's Brief, p.43. Defendant is mistaken.

As

between plaintiff and defendant, the trial court ordered
plaintiff to pay this debt and save and hold defendant harmless
therefrom.

(DOD, p.9, 1l5, index 104)

POINT VI: PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEYS1
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
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In the event that plaintiff substantially prevails on
appeal, the Court should award plaintiff his attorneys' fees and
costs on appeal.

(See

Lyncrle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1033

(Utah App. 1992)) stating "Generally, when the trial court awards
fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on
appeal."

The Court should note that in the instant case,

attorney's fees were resolved by stipulation in the division of
the marital estate.

(FOF, p.6, 1l3, index 91; TR, p.90, 1.13 to

p.91, 1.16))
CONCLUSION
Defendant complains that the trial court abused its
discretion with respect to a number of matters.

Rather than

marshalling the supporting evidence and then demonstrating that
the evidence is inadequate to sustain the trial court's findings,
defendant has attempted to retry this case in the Court of
Appeals by advancing the evidence and arguments supporting her
position.

This Court, however, is not "free to substitute [its]

judgment for that of the trial court."

Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831

P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah App. 1992).
The record contains ample evidence to show that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any
matter on appeal. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish
that the trial court's factual determinations were clearly
erroneous, that is, that the trial court's findings are in
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conflict with the clear weight of the evidence or create a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

As

such, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this

/U

day of September, 1992.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By

{^X^M\J^^/
James P. Cowley
(_.^^
Clark K. Taylor
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellee to be hand
delivered this

/u

day of September, 1992, to the following:

Kellie F. Williams
Corporon & Williams
310' South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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C.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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1987 Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act
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[Defendant's] Proposed Property Distribution

G.
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
James P. Cowley (073 9)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAN BAKER,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
LUJUANA BAKER,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE
Civil No. 914902633DA
Judge David S. Young

The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young,
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on
Thursday, March 26, 1992.
Exhibits were received.
on the record.

The parties were sworn and testified.
The parties entered into a stipulation

The Court has heretofore made and entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based upon the matters

on file herein, the testimony of the parties, the Exhibits
received into evidence, the stipulation of the parties and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered in

this matter and good cause appearing, the Court now makes and
enters this Judgment and Decree of Divorce:
1.

The parties are each given and granted a Judgment

and Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony and
divorcing each from the other.

This divorce shall be final upon

entry of this Judgment.
2.

There is awarded to the Defendant the care,

custody and control of the two minor children who are issue of
the marriage, to wit:
Camille Ann born Jan. 4, 1983, 9 years of age
Dannie born December 5, 1983, 8 years of age
There is reserved to the Plaintiff liberal and
generous rights of visitation, including the right to visit with
the children at all reasonable times and places and not less
than the amount established in the visitation policy adopted by
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

The Defendant shall keep the Plaintiff informed

as to the health, education, welfare and social and religious
development of the children and the Plaintiff shall have open
and free access to the health, education and religious records
of the children.

The Defendant shall consult with and advise

the Plaintiff about major decisions that affect the children.
Without diminishing Defendant' s authority and responsibility as
-2g \wpl\213\0C001bsr W51

the custodial parent, she shall listen to and consider
recommendations and suggestions of the Plaintiff with respect to
the children.

Neither party shall, by word or conduct,

denigrate the other to or in the presence of the children and
each party shall encourage an open, free and loving relationship
between the children and the other party.
3.

The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as child

support, for the use and benefit of the two (2) minor children,
the sum of $1,600.00 per month, commencing with the month of
April 1992.

Eight hundred dollars ($800.00) thereof shall be

payable on or before the 5th day of each month and the other
$800.00 shall be payable on or before the 20th day of each
month.

In addition to the child support herein provided for,

the Plaintiff shall, for so long as he has a duty to pay child
support, maintain insurance upon his life with unencumbered
death benefits in the amount of $150,000.00 payable at the
option of the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the children, their
guardian or a corporate trustee for the use and benefit of the
children.
4.

The Plaintiff shall maintain health and accident

insurance for the use and benefit of the children.

The

Defendant shall pay all uninsured, routine medical and dental
-3g: \wpI\213\00001bsr. W51

expenses, including routine office visits, examinations and
immunizations.

The parties shall each pay one-half (1/2) of all

other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and dental
expenses.

The Plaintiff shall be entitled to take a credit

against his child support obligation in an amount equal to the
cost incurred by him in maintaining the health and accident
insurance for the benefit of the children.

The Plaintiff shall

provide the Defendant with written verification by his employer
establishing the cost incurred by the Plaintiff for maintaining
health and accident insurance for the children only.
5.

Commencing with the month of April 1992, the

Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant, as alimony, the sum of
$1,200.00 per month.

Commencing with the month after the month

in which the residential property referred to in paragraph 9
below is sold or with the month of October 1992 (whichever
occurs first), the alimony herein provided for shall be
increased to the sum of $1,400.00 per month.

One-half (1/2) of

the alimony shall be payable on or before the 5th day of each
month and one-half (1/2) shall be payable on or before the 20th
day of each month.

The alimony herein provided for shall

terminate upon the first of the following events:
a.

The death of either party;
-4-
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b.

The remarriage of the Defendant;

c.

Cohabitation by the Defendant under

circumstances that would cause alimony to be terminated in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
6.

The alimony and child support herein provided for

is premised and predicated upon current total gross compensation
of the Plaintiff (including bonuses and car allowance) of
$150,120.00 per year and is further premised and predicated on
the fact that while the Defendant is a trained, educated,
qualified and certified school teacher, she is currently
unemployed and presently has no income.
7.

For each calendar year (commencing with calendar

year 1992 and thereafter) that the Plaintiff has completely paid
and discharged his obligation for child support, Plaintiff shall
be entitled to take and claim the minor child, Dannie, as a
dependent exemption deduction upon Plaintiff's federal and state
income tax returns.
8.

The parties shall cooperate with each other and

the Defendant shall furnish information to the Plaintiff
necessary to complete the 1991 federal and state income tax
returns.

If there is a net refund of both the federal and state

income taxes, then fifty percent (50%) of the net refund shall
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belong to the Plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) shall belong to
the Defendant.

If further federal and state taxes are due for

calendar year 1991, the Plaintiff s.hall pay and discharge the
same.
9.

The residence of the parties at 11718 South

Eureka Way, South Jordan, Utah, is awarded to the Plaintiff, who
shall immediately list the same for sale with a real estate
broker.

Pending the sale of the subject property, the Defendant

and the minor children shall reside therein and shall care for
and maintain the premises.

Commencing with the month of April

1992 and continuing through the month of September 1992, or
until the property is sold (whichever occurs first), the
Defendant shall pay upon the mortgage indebtedness on said
property the sum of $1,000.00 per month and the Plaintiff shall,
each month during said time period, pay the balance of the
mortgage payment.

If the property has not been sold by the end

of September 1992, then thereafter and commencing with the month
of October 1992, the Defendant shall make the full monthly
mortgage payment on said property until the same is sold.

The

award of the residential property is subject to the mortgage
thereon which (except as otherwise provided herein), shall be
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paid and discharged by the Plaintiff who shall save and hold the
Defendcint harmless therefrom.
10.

The household furnishings, fixtures, appliances

and personal property located in the residential property may be
used by the Defendant and minor children for so long as they
reside in the property.

At such time as the Defendant vacates

the property, the parties shall divide the furnishings,
fixtures, appliances and personal property between them on an
equal basis.
11.

By a separately entered and appropriate Qualified

Domestic Relation Order(s), there shall be divided equally
between the parties, all pension, profit sharing, retirement,
IRA, thrift plans, savings plans and other such benefits and
plans in which the parties have an interest(s) and the value(s)
thereof as of the date hereof.
12.

There is awarded to the Defendant as her sole and

separate property, her jewelry, clothing and personal effects,
together with the 1990 Ford Bronco operated by the Defendant.
The award to the Defendant of the motor vehicle herein described
is subject to a debt thereon in the approximate amount of
$14,500.00 payable to Plaintiff's credit union at the rate of
$396. 00 per month.

Commencing with the month of April 1992, the
-7-
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Defendant shall promptly pay, when due, the monthly payments to
the credit union until said indebtedness has been discharged.
13.

The Defendant shall pay and discharge all debts

and liabilities incurred by her since the separation of the
parties in May, 1991, and not otherwise provided for herein and
she shall save and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
14.

In addition to the family residence referred to

in paragraph 9 above, the Plaintiff is awarded as his sole and
separate property, the following specific assets:
a.

Approximately 2V acres of undeveloped land

b.

A 1991 GMC operated by the Plaintiff,

in Price, Utah;

subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of
$19,000.00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge;
c.

A 1989 Ford Bronco operated by the Plaintiff

subject to the debt thereon in the approximate amount of
$10, 800. 00 which the Plaintiff shall pay and discharge;
d.

A horse identified as a 2 year old filly;

e.

A horse identified as D. B. Cooper;

f.

All of the tack and related equipment for

g.

The garden, power and hand tools;

the horses;
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h.

U. S. Savings Bonds with a value of

approximately $600.00;
i.

The Plaintiff's clothing, jewelry and

personal effects;
j.

A bonus and promotion payment recently

received by the Plaintiff incident to his 1991 employment in the
net sum of approximately $12,000.00;
15.

The Plaintiff shall pay and discharge the

following additional debts and obligations and shall save and
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom:
a.

b.

K-plus loan no. 1 owing to
Pacific Power

K-plus loan no. 2 owing t o
Pacific Power

c.

(926.00)

Loan payable to Mr. and Mrs.
Paul Baker

(94,389.00)

d.

Loan payable to Pacific Power

e.

Payable to Dr. Hicks

f.
g.

Payable to Olivette Furniture
Plaintiff's attorney's fees and
costs incurred in this action

h.

Payable to Defendant7 s attorney
in this action to apply upon
attorney7 s fees and costs incurred
by the Defendant in this action
(2,500.00)
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(1,762.00)

(6,700.00)
(560.00)
(2,000.00)

i.

16.

The Plaintiff shall pay and
discharge all debts and liabilities
incurred by him since the separation of the parties in May,
1991, and not otherwise provided
for herein and he shall save and
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.

The parties are ordered and directed to take such

action and make and execute all such documents and do such
things as are necessary to implement the provisions hereof.
17.

An Order to Withhold and Deliver Income shall be

entered when, and if, Defendant becomes delinquent in his
support obligation, and appropriate income withholding
procedures shall apply to existing and future payors, and all
withheld income shall be submitted to the Court, or to the
Office of Recovery Services under the provisions of §62A-11-401
et seq. , Utah Code Ann.
DATED this

%

/fa

day of Ha%eh, 1992.
BY THE COURT

v i d S.
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/

K e l l i e F. W i l l i a m s
A t t o r n e y for Defendant

Date
-10-
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Young,

Judge

PLAINTIFF'S EARNINGS AND PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED
ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION THEREOF
Annual
Plaintiff's current gross annual income
Includes car allowance of $7,800 and
average bonus
Less FICA withheld
Withholding for health and accident insurance
Withholding for accidental death
Withholding for dental insurance
Withholding for life insurance
Withholding for vision insurance
Car payment on GMC at $452.00 per month
Car payment on Bronco at $264.00 per month
Monthly payment to Olivette Furniture - $200.00
Repayment of K-plus no. 1 loan @ $135.00 per month
Repayment of K-plus no. 2 loan @ $57.00 per month
Pay Dr. Hicks at $25.00 per month
Payment to Paul Baker at $750.00 per month
Pay Pacific Power at $400.00 per month
Child support for two children at $1,600.00
per month

$150, 120 .00
(5,115. 00)
(468. 00)
(210. 00)
(192. 00)
(821. 00)
(120. 00)
(5,424. 00)
(3,168. 00)
(2,400. 00)
(1,6 20. 00)
(684. 00)
(300. 00)
00. 00)
(12,000. 00)
(4,8
(19,284.00)

Balance available for tax and support of the parties

$ 93,514.00

Suggested alimony for Mrs. Baker at $1,400.00
per month

(16,800.00)

Federal and state taxes payable by Mr. Baker
calculated as follows:
Gross income
Less alimony
Less 2 personal exemptions
and itemized deductions
Taxable income
Federal and state tax at
combined estimated rate
Federal & state income tax

$150,120.00
(16,800.00)
(5,000.001
$128,320.00
x.33
($42,345.001
($34,009.00)

Net cash available for Mr. Baker
Monthly
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$ 2,834.00

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT^

Month

Annual

Net cash for Mrs. Baker and children
Child support
Alimony
With alimony and child
with Mrs. Baker filing
taking the children as
incur Federal or State

g:\wpl\213\0000177t.W51

$1,600.00
1,400.00
$3,000.00
support at this level and
as head of household and
exemptions, she will not
income tax liabilities.

$19,284.00
16,800.00
$36,084.00

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
James P. Cowley (0739)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAN BAKER,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
LUJUANA BAKER,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 914902633DA
Judge David S. Young

The Plaintiff and the Defendant and their respective
counsel appeared for trial before the Honorable David S. Young,
Judge of the above-entitled Court at the hour of 8: 00 a. m. on
Thursday, March 26, 1992.
Exhibits were received.
on the record.

The parties were sworn and testified.
The parties entered into a stipulation

Based on the foregoing and based upon the

matters on file herein, the Court now makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are both actual and

bonafide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and were
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for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the
commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each

other on June 8, 1970.
3.

There are irreconcilable differences between the

parties making a continuation of the marital relationship
impossible.
4.

Three (3) children have been born as issue of

this marriage.

One (1) of the children is beyond her eighteenth

(18th) birthday.

Two (2) of the children are minors and reside

with the Defendant.

Their names, birthdays and ages are as

follows:
Camille Ann born Jan. 5, 1983, 9 years of age
Dannie born December 6, 1983, 8 years of age
5.

The Defendant is a good mother and the care,

custody and control of the two (2) minor children should be
awarded to the Defendant, reserving to the Plaintiff the right
to visit with said children at all reasonable times and places.
6.

The Plaintiff is employed and his current annual

gross compensation, including car allowance and anticipated
bonuses, is $150,120.00.

The Plaintiff has been the primary

wage earner during the marriage.

The parties' incomes for the

previous years, including bonuses and relocation reimbursement,
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are as follows:

1990 - $169,248; 1989 - $120,434; 1988 -

$111,715; 1987 - $92,674; 1986 - $76,149.
7.

The Defendant is an educated, trained and

qualified teacher in the Utah public school system and she is in
good health.

She last worked and last taught a full contract

year for the school year 1989-1990.

She has worked during the

majority of the parties' marriage as a school teacher or
secretary.

She is currently uncertified, but can recertify upon

completion of three (3) academic hours of training which she can
readily obtain between now and the beginning of the 1992-1993
school year.

The Defendant is currently unemployed and

presently has no income.
8.

The Defendant testified that her monthly expenses

are $4,, 800. 00 per month, excluding her car payment which is
$396.00, for a total of $5,196.00 per month.

The Defendant

testified that those expenses include the expenses attendant to
herself, her two children, and the two grandchildren residing in
her home.

The expenses related to the two grandchildren are not

relevant to, nor should they be considered in, the Court' s award
of alimony and child support.
9.

Premised and predicated upon the total gross

compensation of the Plaintiff (including bonuses and car
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allowance) of $1507 120.00 and further premised and predicated
upon the fact that the Defendant is currently unemployed and
currently has no income, reasonable child support to be paid by
Plaintiff to Defendant for the benefit of the two (2) children
is $1,600.00 per month.

The income level of the Plaintiff

exceeds the guideline amounts set forth in Utah Code Ann. §7845-1 and the Court finds $1,600.00 to be a reasonable sum.
Given the Plaintiff's current income and the fact that the
Defendant is not currently employed and is without income and
given the debts and expenses of the parties, most of which must
be paid by the Plaintiff and given the needs of the Plaintiff
and the Defendant, reasonable alimony to be paid by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant is $1,400.00 per month.
10.

The Plaintiff has available to him through his

place of employment, health and accident insurance coverage for
the benefit of the minor children.
11.

The 1991 federal and state income tax returns

have not been filed but it is to the benefit of the parties that
they cooperate and file joint returns for calendar year 1991.
12.

The Plaintiff has, or can obtain, insurance upon

his life with unencumbered death benefits in the amount of
$150,000.00 and it is in the interest of the children that he do
-4g \wpl\213\00001bsr W51

so for purposes of providing support for the children in the
event of Plaintiff s untimely death.
13.

The assets and (liabilities) of the parties

accumulated and incurred during the marriage and currently
outstanding and an equitable division thereof is as follows:
No.

Description

Mrs. Baker

(a)

Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way

(b)

Mortgage on residence

(c)

Household furnishings and

Mr. Baker
$183,000.00
(143,000.00)

fixtures at residence

$15,000.00

(d)

2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah

(e)

1990 Ford Bronco operated
by Mrs. Baker

15,000.00
6,000.00

17,000.00

(f)

Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00)

(g)

1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker

(h)

Purchase debt on 1991 GMC

(i)

1989 Ford Bronco

(j)

Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco

(k)

Horse - 2 year filly

(1)

Horse - D. B.

(m)

Garden, power & hand tools

(n)

Tack for horses

400.00

(o)

U.S. Savings Bonds

600.00

(19,000.00)
12,000.00
(10,800.00)
2,000.00

Cooper

1,500.00

-5g \wpl\213\O00Olbsr W51

18,000.00

2,000.00

(p)
(q)

K - p l u s l o a n no.
Pacific Power

1 owing t o

K - p l u s l o a n no.

2 owing t o

(1,762.00)

Pacific Power

(926,00)

(r)

Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents

(s)

Loan payable to Pacific Power

(t)

Payable to Dr. Hicks

(u)

Payable to Olivette Furniture

(v)

Estimated attorney' s fees for
Mr. Baker
Estimated attorney' s fees for
Mrs. Baker

(w)
(x)

(6,700.00)
(560.00)

Clothing and personal effects
each party - not valued NET VALUES

(y)

(94,389.00)

(2,000.00)

(2,500.00)
(2,500.00)
NV

NV

$17, 500. 00 5(43, 637. 00)

Together with an equal division between the parties of
all 401K, pension and retirement funds of both parties
per appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations and other
necessary orders.
14.

The obligation set forth in subparagraph (r) of

paragraph 14 above, which is a loan repayable to the Plaintiff s
parents in the amount of $94,389.00 (which does not include any
interest), is a marital debt of the parties which must be
considered in the division of the marital estate and which
accordingly reduces the marital net worth of the parties to a
negative net worth.

The debt was incurred from time to time
-6-
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commencing in 1984 and some payments have been made thereon as
evidenced by Defendant' s Exhibit 3.

Since Plaintiff is charged

with the responsibility for repayment of that debt to
Plaintiff's parents, the division of the marital net worth, as
provided for in paragraph 14 above, leaves the Plaintiff with a
negative net worth of $43,637.00, while the assets being awarded
to the Defendant have a positive net worth of $17,500.00.

The

Court finds this imbalance to be necessary and equitable because
the Plaintiff is the only party who has earnings with which the
liabilities of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 14 above,
can be paid.
15.

While there was some evidence that Defendant's

parents have, during the course of the marriage, provided some
support to the Plaintiff and Defendant, there was no evidence
that it was other than a gift and there was no evidence that
Defendant' s parents expected the repayment thereof.
16.

At the time of trial, the Plaintiff had in his

bank account the approximate sum of $12,000.00 resulting from
receipt by him of a recent bonus.

The $12,000.00 is not

scheduled as a separate asset because it is part of and included
in Plaintiff's income stream of $150,120.00.

-7g \wpl\213\00001bsr W51

17.

Because of the substantial debt of the parties

and the resulting negative net worth, the parties cannot afford
to maintain and make the mortgage payments on the residence at
11718 S. Eureka Way and the same must be sold at the earliest
possible time.

The parties stipulated that the marital

residence has a value of $183,000.00.

Pending sale, it is

reasonable that the Defendant be permitted temporary possession
of said real property.
approximately $1,665.00.

The monthly mortgage obligation is
Pending sale, it is reasonable that

the Defendant pay $1,000.00 of that monthly mortgage obligation
and the Plaintiff pay the balance of the mortgage until October
1, at which time, if the home is not yet sold, the Defendant
should pay the entire mortgage obligation.

During the period

that the Plaintiff is contributing to the mortgage obligation,
it is reasonable that the alimony be reduced to the rate of
$1, 200. 00 per month.
18.

The parties stipulated (and the Court finds the

stipulation reasonable) to the effect that Plaintiff would pay
to the Defendant, for the use and benefit of her attorneys, an
additional sum of $2,500.00 which is in addition to the previous
attorney' s fees paid by the Plaintiff for the benefit and use of
the Defendant m

the amount of $1, 500. 00.
-8-
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19.

The parties stipulated that commencing with

calendar year 1992 and thereafter and for so long as Plaintiff
has completely paid and discharged his obligation for child
support, Plaintiff would be entitled to take and claim the minor
child, Dannie, as a dependent exemption deduction upon
Plaintiff's federal and state income tax returns and that
Defendant would be entitled to take and claim the minor child,
Camille Ann, as a dependent exemption deduction upon her federal
and state income tax returns.
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court now makes
and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
20.

The parties are each entitled and should each be

granted a Judgment and Decree divorcing each party from the
other.
21.

The Defendant should be granted the care, custody

and control of the two (2) minor children who are issue of the
marriage.

There should be reserved to the Plaintiff, liberal

and generous visitation rights.
22.

The Court should make and enter its Judgment and

Decree of Divorce and Order, consistent with and including and

-9g \wpi\213\00001bsr W51
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embracing the matters that are set forth and implicit within the
foregoing Findings of Fact and resulting equitably therefrom.
DATED this f{0

day of *£$£&, 1992.
BY THE COURT

m

David S. Young, Judge

APPROVED AS TO, FORM:

/; /..'

Yfellie ,/F/ 'Williams
Attorne'y for Defendant

Date
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other itau hit igreed to pey expeoies incurred by
the ittomey general in bringing the action.
(3) The idininittritor may request thit the artorney feneni of mother stite or any other person
bring i n action in the name of the administrator in
the other state to enforce the unclaimed property
laws of this state. This state shall pay an expenses
including attorney's fees in any action under this
subsection. The administrator may agree to pay the
person bringing the action attorney's fees based in
whole or in part on a percentage of the value of any
property recovered in the action.
tow
71-44-36. Interest oa detbMpeflt delivery . Ovil
penalties - Criminal penalties.
(1) A person who fails to pay or deliver property
within the time prescribed by this chapter shall pay
to the administrator interest at the annual rate of
2*k above the local prime lending rate on the property or value thereof from the date the property
should have been paid or delivered.
(2) A person who willfully fails to file any
report, or perform a duty required under this
chapter, or to pay or deliver property to the administrator as required under this chapter shall pay a
civil penalty equal to 207t of the value of the property that should have been paid or delivered.
(3) A person who willfully refuses after written
demand by the administrator to pay or deliver property to the administrator as required under this
chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and upon
conviction may be punished by a fine of not more
than $2,000.
tft3
78-44-37. Agreement to pay compensation to
recover reported property inenforceahk.
AU agreements to pay compensation to recover or
assist in the recovery of property reported under
section 78-44-18, made within 24 months after
the date payment or delivery is made under section
78-44-20, are unenforceable.
m?
78-44-38. Property in foreign conntry or from
foreign transaction exempt*
This chapter does not apply to any property held
in a foreign country and arising out of a foreign
transaction.
ms
78-44-39. Dnties nnder prior law • Property to
he tednded hi taifiai report
(1) This chapter does not relieve a holder of a
duty to report, nay, or deliver property arising
before July 1, 1983. Such holder who fails to
comply before that date is subject to the applicable
enforcement and penalty provisions in existence at
that time and those provisions are continued in
effect for the purpose of this subsection, subject to
subsection 78-44-30(2).
(2) The initial report to be filed under this
chapter for property that was not required to be
reported before July 1, 1983, but which is subject to
this chapter shall include all items of property that
would have been presumed abandoned during the
ten-year period prior to July 1, 1983, as if this
chapter had been in effect during that period.
tttJ
78-44-40. Application and construction of
chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law with respect to the subject of this chapter
among states enacting it.
ita?

pfS^uS*

Code

7MS4.

Chapter 45. Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Ad
7845-1. Short title.
78-45-2. DtflaWoat.
78-454. Doty of ana.
7 8 4 M . Doty of wooua.

7845-4.1 Doty of •tcppareat to sopport stepchild Effect of temlostioo of mmf\a%t or COOIOMMI law
itlatioojoip.
78-45-4.2. Natoral or adoptive poreot lot primary
obttfadoo of sopport - Right of stepparcoi to recover
sopport.
78-45-4J. Ward of state - Primary obttgatioa to
npport.
78-45*5. Doty of obttgor regardleai of preeeacc or
wrioVoce of obMgee.
78-45-*. District coort Jojitdktfoo.
78-45-7. Doteraioatioo of aaaooot of fopport •
AIM urn f t formal* for temporary fopport.
78-45-7.1. Medical tod Oeatai ezpeoaet of depeodoat
chMrea • AimgoJag responsibility for paymeat •
lojoraoce coverage.
78-454. Cootteafog jarioActJoa.
78-45-f. Eoiorcecoeot of right of sopport.
78-454.1. Repealed.
78-45-fJ. Coooty attoroey to aaaist oblgee.
78-45-18. Appcak.
78-45-11. Hoabood aad wife prirOeged commaakatkm
wapfrVtble - Competeocy of spoojes.
78-45-12. Rights are • sddtooo to thooe preteaHy
exbtiog.
78-45*13. loiefpretatioo tad cooatncHoo.
78-4M. Short title.
This act may be cited i s the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
iff?
78-45-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) 'State' includes any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(2) 'Obligor* means any person owing a duty of
support.
(3) 'Obligee* means any person to whom a duty
of support is owed.
<4) 'Child* means a son or daughter under the
age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a hving and
without sufficient means.
(5) 'Parent' includes a natural parent, in adoptive parent, or a stepparent,
(6) 'Stepparent* means a person ceremonially
married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive
parent or one living with the natural or adoptive
parents as a common law spouse, whose common
law marriage was entered into in a state which recognizes the validity of common law marriages.
(7) 'Stepchild* means any child with a stepparent.
(8) 'Earnings* means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically
include all gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined, including profit gained
through sale or conversion of capital assets.
mi
78-45-3. Doty of maa.
Every man shall support his child; and he shall
support his wife when she is in need.
tor*
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78-45-4.

Jodldal Code

78-45-4. Daty e l wosaaa.
Every woman shall support her child; and she
shall support her husband when he is in need.
tm
71-45-4.1 Duty of stepparent to support stepchild
• Effect of termination of marriage or commoa
law relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required
to support a child. Provided, however, that upon
the terminatjion of the marriage or common law
relationship between the stepparent and the child's
natural or adoptive parent the support obligation
shall terminate.
ust
78-45-4.2. Nataral or adoptive pat-eat has
primary obligation of support - Right of
stepparent to recover support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary
obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has
the same right to recover support for a stepchild
from the natural or adoptive parent as any other
obligee.
im
78-45*4.3. Ward of state - Primary obligation to
support.
Notwithstanding section 78-45-2, a natural or
an adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child
has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the
primary obligation to support that child until he
reaches the age of majority.
my
78-45-5. Daty of obligor regardless of presence or
residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of
the presence or residence of the obligee.
ifS7
71-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all
proceedings brought under this act.
i*s7
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support Assessment formula for temporary support.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change of circumstance on the
part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has occurred, the court
in determining the amount of prospective support,
shall consider all relevant factors including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(0 the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court
snail determine and assess all arrearages based upon,
but not limited to:
(a) the amount of public assistance received by
the obligee, if any;
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and
necessarily expended in support of spouse and children.
(4) In determining the amount of prospective
support on an ex parte or other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the support order. The
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formula shall provide for aM relevant factors which
can be readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the obligor's earnings for
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses.
The assessment formula shall be established by the
Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 783-21(3).
ww
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of
dependent children - Assigning responsibility for
payment - Insurance coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior
court order makes no specific provision for the
payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the court shall include in its order a
provision assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court may also
include a provision requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and
dental care insurance for those children.
MM
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or
vacate the order of support where justice requires.
1SS7
7845-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) The obligee may enforce his right of support
against the obligor and the state department of
social services may proceed pursuant to this act or
any other applicable statute, either on its own behalf
or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor. Whenever any
court action is commenced by the state department
of social services to enforce payment of the
obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of
the attorney general or the county attorney, of the
county of residence of the ob^gee, to represent that
department.
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to
recover support due or owing that obligee whether
under this act or any other applicable statute
without first filing an affidavit with the court at the
time the action is commenced stating whether that
obligee has received public assistance from any
source. If the obligee has received public assistance,
the obligee shall join the department of social services as a party plaintiff in the action. The department of social services shall be represented as providedin subsection (1) of this section.
ism
7845-9.1. lepeaM.
MS4
78-45-9.2. Comity attorney to assist oWigee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act
in the following manner:
(1) Provide forms, approved by the judicial
council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment if
the obligee is not represented by legal counsel;
(2) The county attorney's office may charge a fee
not to exceed S25 for providing assistance to an
obligee under subsection (1).
(3) Inform the obligee of the right to file impecumously if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses
of the action and assist the obligee with such filing;
(4) Advise the obligee of the available methods
for service of process; and
(5) Assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a
hearing before the court.
ism
78-45-10. Appeals.
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments
under this act as in other civil actions.
ifS7
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7 M S - 1 1 . Hatband and wife prtrfleged
commaakatkM inapplicable - Competency of
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure
of communications between husband and wife are
inapplicable under this act. Spouses are competent
witnesses to testify to any relevant mailer, including
marriage and parentage.
its?
7S-45-12. Rights are in addition to those
presently existing.

The rights herein created are in addition to and
not in substitution to any other
rights.
t*S7
7S-45-13. Interpretation and construction.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it*
u$i

Chapter 45a. Uniform Act on Paternity
7*45i-l. ObUg itiois of t*e fither.
7*45i-2. Enforce meat.
7*45i-3. Limititioi o i recovery from tie fitter.
7145*4. LimhiUou o i recovery from father's esUte.
7145*4. Remedies.
7*45*4. Time of trill.
7*45*-7. Aatiority for blood tests.
7*45*4. Sefcctioi of experts.
7*45*-f. Compemtkni of expert wttiestes.
7*45*10. Effect of test remits.
7*45a-11.
7*451-12. Secarity.
7*45i-U. Setnemeat igreemeits.
7*451-14. Veiie.
7*45*15.. Uniformity of kiterpretitioi.
7145+14. Skort tide.
7*45*17. Opentioi of act.
7S-45a-l. ObUgations of the father.
The father of a child which is or may be born out
of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father
of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child
is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the
education, necessary support and funeral expenses
of the child. A child born out of wedlock includes a
child born to a married woman by a man other than
her husband.
vm
7S-45a-2. Enforcement.
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of
the mother, child, or the public authority chargeable
by law with the support of the child. If paternity
has been determined or has been acknowledged
according to the laws of this state, the liabilities of
the father may be enforced in the same or other
proceedings (1) by the mother, child, or the public
authority which have furnished or may furnish the
reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement,
education, necessary support, or funeral expenses,
and (2) by other persons including private agencies
to the extent that they have furnished the reasonable
expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education,
necessary support, or funeral expenses.
i*ts
7S-45a-3. limitation on recovery from the fither.
The father's liabilities for past education and
necessary support are limited to a period of four
years next preceding the commencement of an
action.
1*5
7S-45a~4. limitations on recovery from father's
estate.

The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are limited to amounts accrued
prior to his death and such sums as may be payable

Pn*o. Stab
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for dependency under other laws.
t%5
7 M $ * 5 . Remedies.
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action
under this act and all remedies for the enforcement
of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary
support, or funera) expenses for legitimate children
apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to
modify or revoke a judgment for future education
and necessary support. All remedies under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
are available for enforcement of duties of support
under this act.
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support
against the obligor and the state department of
WOai services may proceed on behalf of the obligee
•^ in Its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of
chapter 45b of this title to enforce that right of
support against the obligor. In such actions by the
department, all the provisions of chapter 45b of this
title shall be equally applicable to this chapter.
Whenever a court action is commenced by the state
department of social services, it shall be the duty of
the attorney general or the county attorney, of the
county of residence of the obligee, to represent that
department.
ms
7t-4Sn-i. Time of trial.
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy of the mother, the
trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged
father, be held until after the birth or miscarriage
but during such delay testimony may be perpetrated
according to the laws of this state.
ms
7M$a-7. Authority for blood tests. .
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose
blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party
to the action made at'a time so as not to delay the
proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child
and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any
party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may
resolve the question of paternity against such party
or enforce its order if the rights of others and the
interests of justice so require.
ms
7M$a-l. Selection of experts.
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as
examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by
the court. The experts shall be called by the court as
witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be
subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any
party or person at whose suggestion the tests have
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of
which may be offered in evidence. The number and
qualifications of such experts shall be determined by
the court.
1*5
7*-45i-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable
amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order.
The court may order that it be paid by the parties in
such proportions and at such times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party
but not appointed by the court shall be paid by the
party calling him but shall not be taxed as costs in
the action.
ms
78-4$a-10. Effect of test results.
If the court fmds that the conclusions of all
experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the
tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of
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STATEMENT OF ASSETS & (LIABILITIES)
AND
PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTED DIVISION THEREOF
Item
No.

Description

1.

Residence at 11718 S. Eureka Way

$183,000.00

2.

Mortgage on residence

(143,000.00)

3.

Household furnishings and
fixtures at residence

4.

2 3/4 acres in Price, Utah

5.

1990 Ford Bronco operated
by Mrs. Baker

Mrs. Baker

$15,000.00

Mr. Baker

15,000.00
6,000.00

17,000.00

6.
Purchase debt on 1990 Ford Bronco (14,500.00)
18,000.00

7.
1991 GMC operated by Mr. Baker

(19,000.00)

8.
Purchase debt on 1991 GMC
9.
10.
11,
12,
13,
14,
15,

12,000.00
1989 Ford Bronco
(10,800.00)
Purchase debt on 1989 Bronco
2,000.00
Horse - 2 year filly
1,500.00
Horse - D.B. Cooper
2,000.00
Garden, power & hand tools
400.00
Tack for horses
600.00

16

U.S. Savings Bonds
K-plus loan no. 1 owing to
Pacific Power

(1,762.00)

17

K-plus loan no. 2 owing to
Pacific Power

(926.00)

18

Loan payable to Plaintiff's parents

19

Loan payable to Pacific Power

20

Payable to Dr. Hicks

21

Payable to Olivette Furniture

g:\wpl\213\0000177t.W51

(94,389.00)
(6,700.00)
(560.00)

22.
23.
24.
25.

Estimated attorney's fees for
Mr. Baker

(2,500.00)

Estimated attorney's fees for
Mrs. Baker

(2,500.00)

Loan payable to Defendant's
parents
Clothing and personal effects
each party - not valued NET VALUES

(33,000.00)
NV

NV

($15,500.00) $(43,637.00)

Together with an equal division of all 401K, pension and
retirement funds of both parties per appropriate Qualified
Domestic Relations and other orders.

g:\wpl\213\0000177t.W51

DAN BAKER v. LDJUANA BAKER

SCHEDULE OF MARITAL ASSETS
and
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED PROPERTY DTSTRIBUTION
ESTIMATED
FAIR MARKET
VALUE

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT

ASSETS:
Real Estate
11718 S. Eureka Way
Price acreage

$ 183,000
6,000

$

~
3,000

Retirement Accounts
401(k) and ESOP

$

60,000*

$

32,199

$

27,801

$

30,000
2,000

$

15,000
2,000

$

15,000

Other Assets
Household Furnishings
Power and Hand Tools
Motor Vehicles
1989 Ford Bronco
1990 Ford Bronco
1991 GMC
Horses (2)
Tack
U.S. Savings Bonds
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS:

11,150
12,400
19,000
3,500
400
800
$ 328,250

Plaintiff's Lien on Eureka Way
SUBTOTAL MARITAL ASSETS:

$ 183,000
3,000

11,150
—
19,000
3,500
400
400
$

85,649

$

20,000

12,400

400
$ 242,601
($

20,000)

$ 328,250

$ 106,649

$ 221,601

$ 143,000
11,600
14,000
18,500
1,762
926
6,700
560
2,000

$

—
11,600
—
18,500
1,762
926
6,700
560
2,000

$ 143,000

($199,048)

($ 42,048)

($ 157,000)

$ 131,202

$ 64,601

LIABILITIES:
Mortgage (Eureka Way)
1989 Bronco
1990 Bronco
GMC
K Plus Loan 1
K Plus Loan 2
Pacific Power
Dr. Hicks
Olivette Furniture
SUBTOTAL LIABILITIES:
NET MARITAL ASSETS:

14,000

$

64,601

* approximate value, funds to be used to equalize distribution of
marital estate
Each party to pay debts incurred in his or her own name since separation
Each party to pay any debts associated with his or her parents
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